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Plaintiffs, being the appellees and cross-appellants herein, 
submit the following Reply Brief in support of their arguments 
raised on cross-appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Reply Brief addresses the issues raised by the 
Plaintiffs on cross-appeal. First, Plaintiffs contend that the 
trial court erred by holding that under Utah's Occupying 
Claimants Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1 et seq., an individual 
must show a belief in "ownership" to satisfy the statutory 
element of "good faith." This issue is reviewed for correctness. 
Plaintiffs assert that the correct reading of the statute does 
not require a belief in ownership per se, but only a belief that 
the party constructing improvements on real property believed 
that he had a right to unlimited and exclusive use of the 
improvements superior to that of any other claimant. 
Second, Plaintiffs contend that the Declaration of Trust by 
which the UEP was established creates a private trust as a matter 
of law. This issue is reviewed for correctness. Plaintiffs 
contend that the Declaration states no charitable purpose and 
provides for a definite and identifiable class of beneficiaries. 
The UEP is thus a private trust on its face, and not a charitable 
trust as adjudged by the district court. 
1 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD IN 
ADJUDICATING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS UNDER UTAH'S OCCUPYING 
CLAIMANTS STATUTE. 
The trial court held that in order to show "good faith" 
under Utah's Occupying Claimants Statute, the Plaintiffs would be 
required to prove a good faith belief that they owned the 
property. Plaintiffs contend herein that it was error to imply 
a belief in "ownership" into the statutory definition of "good 
faith," and dismissal of the claims under the Occupying Claimants 
Statute should be reversed. 
A. The standard of review for this issue is "correctness." 
In State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), this Court 
made clear that questions of law are themselves reviewed for 
correctness, without giving any deference to the trial judge's 
determination of the issue. The court defined "legal 
determinations" as follows: 
". . . those which are not of fact but are 
essentially of rules or principles uniformly 
applied to persons of similar qualities and 
status in similar circumstances." 
Plaintiffs' appeal under the Occupying Claimants' Statute is 
based on a pure issue of law: whether a claimant, in order to 
satisfy the statutory requirement of good faith, must prove a 
good faith belief in "ownership" of the property. The lower 
court addressed this issue and held that although not expressly 
stated in the statute, a requirement of a belief in "ownership" 
should be implied in the law. This legal determination of the 
2 
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district court is purely a question of what the law requires, and 
is therefore reviewed for correctness, without any deference 
being given to the decision of the district court. The issue is 
not within the category of "application of law to fact" discussed 
in Pena, which was discussed at length in the UEP's reply brief.1 
*In its Reply Brief, the UEP cites Pena for the proposition 
that review of the Court's judgment under a theory of unjust 
enrichment involves application of law to fact, and the standard of 
review is therefore within a spectrum running from correctness on 
one hand to broad discretion on the other. Plaintiffs do not 
disagree with that general statement of the law, but submit that 
review of the district court's judgment on Plaintiffs unjust 
enrichment claim in this case requires that extremely broad 
deference be given to the trial court for three reasons. First, 
the issue is fact intensive. Although the UEP attempts to rely 
exclusively on the written findings of the trial court, neither its 
argument nor the written findings themselves are sufficient to 
escape the fact that the issue arises from disputes which are 
almost exclusively factual in nature. The UEP should not be 
permitted to circumvent effective review of these issue by refusing 
to order the transcript and then attempting to spin doctor the 
written findings into something that the trial court, by virtue of 
its own ruling, obviously did not intend. 
Second, application of the factors discussed in Pena itself 
dictates that broad discretion be given the district court in this 
case. Pena set out the following three factors for guaging the 
degree of discretion afforded to the trial court in applying law to 
fact: (1) whether the complexity and varying nature of facts to 
which the law must be applied would prevent an adequate rule from 
being formulated; (2) whether the circumstances are sufficiently 
new to the court that appellate judges cannot effectively identify 
what factors are outcome determinative; and (3) whether the trial 
court has observed "facts," such as a witness's appearance and 
demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot 
adequately be reflected in the record available to the appellate 
Courts. Without further discussion here, Plaintiffs submit that 
these factors, particularly the first and third factors, weigh 
heavily in favor of broad deference to the trial court. Where the 
appellate court does not even have the factual record to review, 
the need for such discretion is even more apparent. 
Finally, broad discretion is consistent with both pre- and 
post-Pena case law addressing similar issues. Equity cases decided 
before Pena universally hold that review of equity cases shall be 
made on the facts and the law, and will not be reversed except to 
prevent manifest injustice. See Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 338 
3 
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B. The trial court erred by expanding the statutory requirement 
of "good faith" to include a belief in "ownership." 
The UEP contends that 80 years of case law support the 
proposition that belief in "ownership" is an element of a claim 
under the Occupying Claimants Statute* That assertion ignores 
the fact that no prior case involves a fact pattern such as the 
one presented here in which claimants had a good faith belief 
that they held an unlimited and exclusive right to occupy and use 
the improvements and the property, but understood that legal 
"title" was vested in the name of another. In short, there 
simply is not a prior case which examines whether belief in 
"ownership" is an element of the "good faith" required by the 
statute. 
Beyond the discussion of prior cases, the UEP's reply brief 
offers no cogent reason why a belief in "ownership" carries out 
(Utah 1980); Penrose v. Penrose. 656 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1982); Parks 
Enterprises v. New Century Realty, 652 P.2d 918 (Utah 1982) . These 
cases are not inconsistent with Pena and its pasture analogy. As 
pasture's go, they merely stand for the proposition that the trial 
court's pasture of discretion in equity cases is extremely large, 
and will only be fenced off where necessary to prevent "manifest 
injustice." Cases since Pena have suggested that discretion is 
broad on similar issues. See State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 781 
(Utah App. 1996) (holding that the question of whether a waiver of 
the right to counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily is highly fact dependent and thus the trial court is 
afforded discretion); Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 
928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996) (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring and 
dissenting) (suggesting that even if the issue of whether a 
contract was modified was viewed as a question of law, the inquiry 
would be fact-dependent, and therefore "a great deal of discretion" 
would be afforded to the trial court); State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 
446 (Utah 1996) (noting that the legal standard for "reasonable 
suspicion" is highly fact dependent, and therefore recognizing a 
measure of discretion for the district court). 
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the statutory purpose better than merely a good faith belief that 
one has the right to unlimited and exclusive use of the 
improvements superior to that of any other party. Plaintiffs 
submit that the statute is intended to do justice to those who 
improve property expressly for their own benefit, only to learn 
that another holds a superior claim to the fruits of their labor. 
Implying a technical "ownership" requirement into the element of 
good faith detracts from this statutory purpose by raising form 
over substance. It treats parties with essentially the same 
problem--the risk of losing valuable improvements that they built 
for their own use--differently based on a technicality of legal 
"title." 
Plaintiffs submit that the statutory definition of "color of 
title" indicates a legislative intention that technical issues of 
"title" not control the inquiry. Specifically, the statute 
defines one as having color of title "if he, or those under whom 
he claims, have at any time during such occupancy with the 
knowledge or consent, express or implied, of the real owner made 
any valuable improvements thereon." Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4. 
Where the statute itself contemplates that construction of 
improvements with consent of the real owner constitutes "color of 
title, " it is not reasonable to imply a requirement that the 
claimant believe himself to be the "real owner" to satisfy the 
statute. 
Plaintiffs submit that for these reasons and for those 
reasons set forth in the principal brief, the better rule of law 
5 
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is that the good faith belief required under the statute is 
merely the belief that one has an unlimited and exclusive right 
to the property superior to that of any other claimant. That 
interpretation is consistent with the language of Hidden Meadows 
Development Co. v. Mills. 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979) , cited by the 
UEP in its reply brief, and consistent with the intent of the 
legislature expressed in the statute. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THAT THE 
UNITED EFFORT PLAN WAS A PRIVATE TRUST ON ITS FACE.2 
In its Reply Brief, the UEP argues that the trust is a 
charitable trust because it serves a charitable purpose and does 
not have definite beneficiaries. Plaintiffs contend that neither 
conclusion is supported by the four corners of the Declaration of 
Trust, and the lower courts' determination should be reversed. 
A. The Declaration of Trust identifies no charitable purpose. 
In its reply brief, the UEP accurately concludes that one 
characteristic of a charitable trust is that it designates and 
serves a charitable purpose. Plaintiffs agree, but contend that 
no charitable purpose is designated in the Declaration of Trust. 
While Article VIII provides that " [t]he purpose and object of the 
trust shall first be charitable and philanthropic" (R. 1840) , the 
document never defines any charitable and philanthropic purpose 
interpretation of a contract is purely a question of law, 5J3 
West Broadway Associates v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake, 784 
P.2d 104 (Utah 1989) . Therefore, this issue is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). See also 
Matter of Estate of Groesbeck. 935 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1997) (holding 
that the validity of a trust is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness). 
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at all. Instead, it merely indicates that the trust will engage 
in "all kinds of legitimate business ventures" (Article VIII, R. 
1840) , and will distribute its earnings to the "members" as 
deemed appropriate by the trustees. (Article XII, R. 1842). In 
short, the Declaration of Trust describes the operation of the 
trust in a manner wholly divorced from any charitable purpose, 
such as those described in the authorities cited by the UEP. 
(See Reply Brief of Appellants, at 23) . 
The UEP's Reply Brief attempts to escape this reality by 
arguing that the "advancement of religion" is a charitable 
purpose. (See Reply Brief of Appellants, at 23) . Plaintiffs 
have no quarrel with that statement of the law. However, the 
Declaration of Trust makes no mention of any religious purpose. 
In fact, the document does not use the words "church, " 
"religion," "God," or even "Priesthood Work." Instead, it talks 
in ' terms of cestui que trustents (preamble, Article XVIII), 
equitable and beneficial interests (preamble), profits 
(preamble) , business ventures (Article VIII), trust membership 
(Article XII), membership certificates (Article XII), dividends 
(Article XII), and distributions (Article XVII). A stated 
purpose to advance religion simply is not stated within the four 
corners of the Declaration of Trust. 
It was error for the lower court to go beyond the plain 
language of the Declaration and find a charitable purpose where 
none can be drawn from the face of the document. The Declaration 
of Trust merely provides for a system by which a group of 
7 
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individuals can engage collectively in carrying on businesses, 
the profits of which will be used to service the needs of the 
group. This arrangement is consistent with a private 
cooperative; it is not consistent with any recognized definition 
of charity. 
B. The Declaration of Trust establishes an identifiable and 
definite group of beneficiaries. 
The UEP agrees that in order to be a charitable trust, the 
UEP must have indefinite and unidentified beneficiaries. It 
argues that "[n]o person was specifically designated in the 
declaration as either a beneficiary or a member . . . ." 
Plaintiffs disagree. 
First, there can be no doubt that at the moment the 
Declaration of Trust was first executed, its beneficiaries were 
John Y. Barlow, Joseph W. Musser, LeRoy S. Johnson, J. Marion 
Hammon, and Rulon T. Jeffs--the original subscribers who signed 
the trust document. That proposition is clear from the very 
preamble of the Declaration which reads in part as follows: 
Further, it is understood and agreed that we and 
such other members as may hereafter come into 
said association are associated together merely 
and solely for purpose of being cesti (sic) que 
trustents of the trust hereby created, thus being 
entitled to the equitable and beneficial 
interests of all profits and property, both 
personal, real and mixed, of the trust estate 
hereby created, in accordance with their 
respective just wants and needs as determined 
from time to time by the Board of Trustees and as 
the trust estate may be able to respond thereto. 
(R. 1837). 
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In short, when the declaration was signed, it had five cesti 
que trustents, or beneficiaries.3 Those five men were definite 
and identified because their names appeared on the trust 
document. Plaintiffs submit that because the trust at its outset 
had five identified beneficiaries who were "entitled to the 
equitable and beneficial interests of all profits and property . 
. . of the trust estate," it was indisputably a private trust at 
the moment of its creation. Plaintiffs are not aware of any 
provision of law or the trust document that would allow the UEP 
to argue that a metamorphosis has occurred since creation of the 
trust sufficient to convert the UEP from a private to a 
charitable trust. 
Second, on the face of the Declaration of Trust, the term 
"members" clearly refers to beneficiaries or cestui que trustents 
of the trust. The first mention of "members" in the Declaration 
is in the language from the Preamble cited above. Therein, the 
term members is expressly equated with "cesti que trustents," or 
beneficiaries. Further definition of the term is offered in 
Article XII as follows: 
Slack's Law Dictionary, defines "cestui que trustent" as 
follows: 
He who has a right to a beneficial interest in and 
out of an estate the legal title to which is vested 
in another. The person who possesses the equitable 
right to property and receives the rents, issues, 
and profits thereof; the legal estate of which is 
vested in a trustee. The beneficiary of a trust. 
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 229. 
9 
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Evidence of membership shall be shown in the 
books of the association. A membership 
certificate may, in the discretion of the 
trustees, be issued to each member; but such 
certificate shall not be transferable, nor carry 
title to any of the property or assets of the 
trust. 
* * * 
Further and additional membership shall be 
established and added to by the consecration of 
such property, real, personal or mixed, to the 
trust in such amounts as shall be deemed 
sufficient by the Board of Trustees . . . 
(R. 1842-43). Finally, the Declaration provides that upon 
termination, the members of record shall share and share alike in 
a distribution of trust property. (Article XVII, R. 1845). 
Plaintiffs contend that the members are the beneficiaries. 
The stated intent of the trust was that individuals become 
members by contributing to the trust, and that such members would 
be recorded in the books and issued certificates.4 The UEP has 
admitted and the trial court found that these procedures have 
been ignored in substantial measure. The trustees' utter failure 
to follow the trust document, however, cannot change the trust 
from a private to a charitable trust. On its face, the trust 
contemplates a discreet, identifiable list of members. These are 
the beneficiaries.5 
4At trial, there was evidence that certificates were actually 
issued in the early years of the trust, but this practice faded out 
prior to any of the Plaintiffs becoming involved with the UEP. 
5Both the UEP and the trial court find significance in the 
provision of the Declaration of Trust allowing the trustees to give 
"needed assistance" to non-members of the trust in their 
discretion. (See R. 1745) . Plaintiffs are aware of no legal 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The trial court recognized that the UEP was to have 
identifiable members, but concluded that being a member did not 
make one a beneficiary. Neither the UEP nor the trial court has 
offered any satisfactory explanation of what the "members" are if 
they are not beneficiaries. Plaintiffs urge this Court to reject 
any notion that the term "members" refers to anything other than 
the beneficiaries of the trust, consistent with the legal 
definition of the trust relationship. Where the Declaration of 
Trust establishes that "members" shall contribute to the trust 
and benefit therefrom, the trust is a private trust, not a church 
or a charity. . ' 
In sum, the UEP was not drafted to be a charitable trust. 
Its purposes were to provide for the maintenance of a discreet 
group of members who would come into the trust by contributing 
sufficient property. In the absence of a charitable purpose and 
in light of the its identifiable and definite class of 
member/beneficiaries, the UEP should be denominated a private 
trust as a matter of law. This matter should thus be remanded to 
the district court so that Plaintiff's claims for accounting, 
breach of fiduciary duty, and distribution may be adjudicated in 
the context of a private trust. 
reason why authorization to distribute property beyond the defined 
class of beneficiaries would change the nature of the trust from 
private to charitable. In fact, it merely acknowledges that there 
is in fact a defined class of members who are the principal objects 
of the trust's beneficence. 
11 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs urge this Court to 
reverse the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs claims under 
Utah's occupying claimants statute and reverse the trial court's 
holding that the UEP is a charitable trust. The matter should be 
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings relevant to 
these issues only. 
DATED this <-y[^ day of September, 1997. 
WOODBURY & KESLERf P.C. 
'y.Jix jLt~ 
Reld W. Lambert/ U 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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